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Patterns of Intergenerational Transfers in Southeast Asia
This article explores motivations for intergenera-
tional exchanges of time and money using data
from Indonesia. The extent of exchange and un-
derlying motivations differ across families but
substantial evidence supports the theory that
transfers within families serve as insurance for
family members. The results also suggest that be-
tween some parents and children money is ex-
changed for time. Additionally, some evidence is
consistent with the idea that parents pay for their
children’s education partly as a loan that is later
repaid. The authors compare their results to those
that they obtained previously for Malaysia using
similar data and methods. The findings regarding
motivations for transfers are remarkably similar
across the two countries.
The family is a critical social institution in pro-
viding support to its members. The effects on this
support of changes in family structures, such as
longer life expectancies and greater diversity of
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family forms, are hotly debated in academic and
policy circles (Bengtson, 2001). One function
families provide is the transfer of resources—both
time and money—among family members. Sci-
entific inquiry into transfers across generations en-
compasses macro and micro perspectives. A con-
siderable literature addresses the evolution of
transfer patterns as societies industrialize, pass
through the demographic transition, and develop
more sophisticated public and private financial
services (Cowgill & Holmes, 1972; Goode, 1963;
Parsons, 1943; Ruggles, 1987; Willis, 1982). Oth-
er research models decision making within fami-
lies to generate predictions about transfer behavior
(Becker, 1974, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 1976;
Cox, 1987).
Complementing theoretical work, empirical
analyses consider how characteristics of parents
and children are related to transfer behavior. In
most developing countries families are the pri-
mary source of support for aging individuals. The
policy salience of family transfer behavior has in-
creased in the developing world as the share of
the elderly population rises but government and
private mechanisms of old age support remain
limited. Families as a source of old age support
have received particular attention in Asia, where
populations are aging rapidly (Hermalin, 1997;
Kinsella, 2000; Knodel & Debavalya, 1997; Kno-
del, Friedman, Ahn, & Cuong, 2000; Martin,
1989).
We examine interhousehold transfers between
adult children and their parents in Indonesia. The
analyses test hypotheses of models of motives for
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intergenerational transfers. To fully explore these
models, one must consider the overall process of
exchange rather than limiting analysis to a narrow
demographic group, a discrete type of support, or
transfers in one direction (Hogan, Eggebean, &
Clogg, 1993). We consider giving and receiving,
of time and money, from the perspectives of par-
ents and adult children. Thorough analysis also
requires detailed data on both generations. We use
extremely rich data from the Indonesia Family
Life Survey.
We set the stage for our analysis of Indonesia
by describing results obtained for Malaysia (Lil-
lard & Willis, 1997b). The comparison is inter-
esting because the countries are sufficiently simi-
lar to suggest common patterns of transfers and
underlying motivations for them. Moreover, be-
cause the data from the two countries are almost
identical, the comparison is relatively free from
the differences in data set content and methods
that often hinder cross-country comparisons.
THEORIES
Several family theories address motivations for
family transfers and generate hypotheses regard-
ing the empirical relationships of characteristics of
parents and children to transfers between them. In
a model of the family developed by Becker (1974,
1991) each household’s head allocates resources
among family members so that no one can be
made better off without making someone else
worse off. Some family members may receive
more resources than they provide. The head may
choose to transfer resources to needier family
members because of altruism. In the context of
transfers from parents to children, the more altru-
istic the head, the more the head will finance in-
vestments in children without expecting repay-
ment (Becker & Tomes, 1976). Altruism may also
lead children to transfer resources to their aging
parents, particularly if parents have instilled a
strong sense of filial responsibility in their chil-
dren (Lee, Parish, & Willis, 1994).
A key distinction between altruism and other
models of transfers is that in an altruistic system
needy family members should receive over their
lifetime more transfers than they provide. Unfor-
tunately, the lack of data on net transfers over the
life course makes this prediction difficult to test.
Other models emphasize a quid pro quo aspect to
transfers (Bernheim, Shleifer, & Summers, 1985).
One such model emphasizing the long-term role
of transfers posits that transfers among kin pro-
vide a source of insurance against risk. Family
members transfer resources to help one another in
times of need. If risks across family members are
not perfectly correlated, when one relative hits a
rough spot (say a crop failure), odds are that an-
other relative will be in a position to offer assis-
tance.
If altruism or insurance motivates transfers,
then at a point in time characteristics indicative of
need (such as poor health or widowhood), should
be positively associated with the receipt of trans-
fers. Our empirical work tests these predictions.
The altruism and insurance models also predict
that transfers to and from an individual should
fluctuate with short-term income. We use retro-
spective information on labor income to examine
whether transfer behavior is sensitive to recent
earnings.
Another model with a quid pro quo element
focuses on the shorter term, hypothesizing that
transfers reflect an exchange of money for time
(Cox, 1987). For example, elderly parents may
care for grandchildren in return for money from
adult children, or able-bodied adult children may
perform chores for their parents in return for mon-
ey. Our data are unusual in that they include in-
formation about provision and receipt of time, as
well as money and goods. We therefore examine
whether the provision of money is related to the
receipt of time, and vice versa.
One of the oldest models for transfers between
parents and children views family as a source of
capital. In a traditional society, children offer the
only long-term mechanism of saving for old age.
Couples have children with the expectation that
children will provide for them in later life (see
Willis, 1980 and references therein). Children
have an incentive to provide old age security for
their parents because parents control land and
family businesses on which children rely for in-
come. Moreover, children who support their par-
ents in old age may view themselves as setting a
precedent for their own children to follow (Ikkink,
Tilburg, & Knipscheer, 1999; Stark, 1995).
Economic development destabilizes this sys-
tem. As financial services develop, individuals
have access to savings methods other than chil-
dren and so fertility declines. Industrialization and
modernization encourage individualism, provide
temptingly lucrative opportunities outside family
businesses, and strengthen ties between husbands
and wives, to the potential detriment of ties be-
tween parents and adult children. In this model
the net flow of resources over the life course, ini-
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tially from young to old, reverses over several
generations (Caldwell, 1976; Goode, 1963).
Although this description is intuitively com-
pelling, evolutionary theory, formal demography,
and a number of empirical findings suggest that,
on balance, net resources flow from old to young
in all but the most developed societies (Kaplan,
1994; Lee, 2000; Preston, 1982; Stecklov, 1997).
Moreover, the description does not fit the experi-
ences of several East Asian countries, which in
the 1980s were characterized by simultaneously
high savings rates, major improvements in chil-
dren’s living standards relative to their parents’,
and elderly reliance on transfers from family
members.
Family may also provide capital in contexts
where the expected earnings of the well-educated
are rising rapidly. Children’s educational needs
occur at ages when they have to rely on their par-
ents. In turn children may repay parents for edu-
cational loans through support during old age. If
they expect to share in the resulting benefits down
the road, it may behoove couples to loan children
money for school to maximize the joint lifetime
wealth of themselves and their children.
If a borrower-lender arrangement for financing
education motivates transfers, then transfers
should be related to children’s enrollment status
and educational attainment. We test for associa-
tions between schooling outcomes and transfers to
assess the degree to which family operates as a
capital market. In a strict borrower-lender rela-
tionship, neither the lender’s characteristics nor
the borrower’s economic circumstances should af-
fect repayment, although loans between parent
and child may be more flexible.
Models in which family functions as a capital
market for old age support or educational loans
are closely related to the model of family as a
source of insurance. Each emphasizes the quid pro
quo nature of transfers between family members
and relies on variation across family members in
the timing of their needs for money. Each requires
family members to comply with a system man-
dating behavior that at times is inconsistent with
immediate self-interest (Willis, 1982). Compli-
ance may be encouraged through anticipation of
inheritance and by instilling loyalty and respon-
sibility during childhood (possibly reinforced by
community norms; Burr & Mutchler, 1999; Lee et
al., 1994; Willis, 1982).
BACKGROUND
The models suggest that transfer patterns are
shaped by a country’s recent economic and de-
mographic history, as well as by underlying norms
regarding relationships between adult children and
their parents. Comparison of two countries resem-
bling each other in these respects allows us to as-
sess whether commonalities in transfer patterns
emerge across similar settings. Malaysia and In-
donesia are well suited for such a comparison. In
this section, we review the two countries’ simi-
larities and evidence regarding transfer motiva-
tions in Malaysia, describe the Indonesian context,
and discuss the factors we consider in examining
motivations for transfers.
Indonesia and Malaysia are geographic and
cultural neighbors. Malays constitute the majority
ethnographic group in both countries and in fact
the national languages of Indonesia and Malaysia
originate from a common source: a trading lan-
guage used for centuries by groups on either side
of the Straits of Malacca (Sievers, 1974, p. 15).
In both countries Islam is the predominant reli-
gion. Malaysia’s economy developed earlier than
Indonesia’s and differences in economic status re-
main: In the early 1990s per capita GDP was three
times higher in Malaysia (Jones, 1994, p. 19;
World Bank, 1997).
Our earlier work on Malaysia (Lillard & Wil-
lis, 1997b) used data from the 1988 Malaysian
Family Life Survey. The structures of the Malay-
sia Family Life Survey and Indonesia Family Life
Survey transfer data are extremely similar and the
same statistical approach is employed.
The results from Malaysia provide support for
three theories of transfers: parental repayment for
school loans, exchange of money for time, and
insurance against risk. Relationships consistent
with the parental repayment hypothesis are espe-
cially strong. Children’s educational attainment is
positively associated with the likelihood and the
amount of transfers that parents receive from their
children. Moreover, consistent with a borrower-
lender relationship, parental income levels do not
affect transfers received from children. Results
from Malaysia are also strongly consistent with
the exchange hypothesis. Couples are more likely
to transfer money to their parents—and to transfer
larger amounts—when the parents have provided
help in the form of time. Similarly, couples are
more likely to receive transfers of money from
their parents when they have provided time to
their parents. Finally, the analysis of Malaysia
supports the theory that transfers provide insur-
ance within families. Transfers to parents from
couples increase in likelihood or in value when
parents are older, in poor health, or widowed.
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Similarly, transfers are related to income levels
and are sometimes more responsive to current
than to long-term income.
Though Malaysia began the transition to a
modern economy earlier, Indonesia’s socioeco-
nomic progress since the mid-1960s is impressive.
Between 1967 and 1997 Indonesia’s per capita
GDP rose by an annual average of almost 5%.
Over the same period Indonesia achieved nearly
universal primary school enrollment and substan-
tial increases in secondary school enrollment. By
the mid-1990s life expectancy surpassed 60 years
and the total fertility rate had fallen to 2.7.
By the 1990s Indonesia was no longer a tra-
ditional high fertility society in which adult chil-
dren’s livelihoods largely depend on their parents’
land. Traditionally, however, family has been the
primary source of old age support. Studies docu-
ment strong economic ties between adult children
and their elderly parents (Chen & Jones, 1989;
Evans, 1990; Hugo, 1992; Rudkin, 1993; Wirak-
artakusumah, Sirait, & Hidayat, 1997). A 1986
survey of elderly Javanese found that 50% of
male respondents and 70% of female respondents
reported relying on children or grandchildren ‘‘for
at least some income’’ (Hugo, 1992). Evidence
from Yogyakarta province suggests that monetary
transfers are targeted to family members who are
older, in poor health, or (in urban areas) unem-
ployed (Ravallion & Dearden, 1988).
In Indonesia strong ties between parents and
adult children are attributed to social norms that
deem children responsible for their elderly par-
ents’ welfare (Geertz, 1961; Wirakartakusumah,
1998). The predominance of these norms emerges
in a survey of experts in adat (traditional) law
conducted in the Indonesia Family Life Survey.
Over 99% of respondents reported that traditional
law obligates children to care for their older par-
ents, and 97% said that when parents live with
one child, other children should provide additional
assistance. Responsibility for one’s aging parents
is also an important tenet of Islam (Mahmood,
1992).
The factors we consider in our analyses of
transfer behavior derive from the models dis-
cussed above. The dependent variables and the
statistical methods are discussed in the next sec-
tion. Our analysis considers transfers from the
perspective of couples in two familial roles: as
parents and as children.
We begin by discussing couples in their role as
parents of adult children. To test the parental re-
payment hypothesis, we carefully consider the
role of children’s schooling. Measures of chil-
dren’s current enrollment status allow us to test
whether parents help finance their children’s ed-
ucation by providing transfers while children are
still in school. We also include measures of chil-
dren’s education in models of monetary transfers
that parents receive from their children (the num-
ber of children currently in school and the num-
bers who are high-school and college graduates,
respectively). These variables reveal whether
transfer receipts increase with children’s educa-
tional attainment. The old age security model pre-
dicts that transfers from children rise as couples
age. Accordingly we include the ages of the hus-
band and the wife in models where the outcome
is the couple’s receipt of transfers from children.
Finally, we include controls for whether the wife
works and the earnings of the husband and wife
because the insurance theory suggests that higher
incomes should decrease receipt of transfers from
children and increase transfers to children.
We now turn to couples in their role as children
of older parents. In keeping with the parental re-
payment hypothesis we include variables for the
child’s level of education, which allows us to test
whether transfers rise with educational attainment.
To assess whether transfers appear to function as
insurance against hard times, we include measures
of long-run earnings based on retrospective data
and recent earnings. The long-run earnings mea-
sure consists of age-adjusted mean monthly earn-
ings over time; the short-term earnings measure
consists of the deviation of current monthly earn-
ings from long-term earnings. The insurance hy-
pothesis suggests that transfer behavior should be
more sensitive to short-term earnings than to long-
term earnings. As a measure of the couple’s need
for parental assistance in the form of time, we
include measures of the number of small children
in the household. Other measures of need reflect
parents’ characteristics and include age and health
status and whether the mother is a widow. To test
the theory of exchange of money for time, we
examine whether the couple’s provision of money
to parents is sensitive to whether parents provided
help in the form of time and whether couples who
receive money from their parents provided help to
them in the form of time. In each specification
from the perspective of couples as children, we
include controls for the work status of wife and
her earnings.
Data
Our empirical analysis uses data from the 1993
Indonesia Family Life Survey to investigate trans-
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TABLE 1. SAMPLE SIZES AND DESCRIPTION: ANY TRANSFERS AND AMOUNT ($U.S.)
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a$1U.S. 5 about 2,100 Indonesian rupiah in 1993. Does not include zero values. bIncludes zero amounts.
fer behavior between parents and adult children.
The survey was conducted in 7,224 households
and represents 83% of the population. Individuals
15 and older were asked to answer extensive ques-
tions about the characteristics of their children 15
and older living outside the household and about
the provision and receipt of money, goods, and
services to and from these children over the 12
months prior to the interview. Similar questions
were posed about noncoresident parents.
We analyze the transfer behavior of married
couples from two perspectives. We consider cou-
ples in their roles as parents, using information
from couples with at least one adult child out of
the household. A total of 2,349 couples have at
least one surviving child 15 or older who does not
reside in the household. We also consider couples
in their roles as adult children with aging parents,
using information for couples in which either the
husband or the wife has a surviving parent. For
2,688 couples the wife has a surviving parent, for
2,315 couples the husband has a surviving parent,
and for 1,688 couples both the husband and the
wife have a surviving parent. Couples with both
a noncoresident adult child and a noncoresident
parent contribute to the analyses from both per-
spectives (928 couples in total).
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on trans-
fers from the perspectives of couples as parents
(Panel A) and as adult children (Panel B). The
information is based on respondents’ answers to
questions about whether, in the past year, they had
provided any help or assistance in the form of
money, goods, or time helping with chores, er-
rands, childcare, or care during illness or because
of poor health. Respondents who answered affir-
matively were queried as to the value of money
or goods provided. Parallel questions were posed
with respect to receipt of help and the monetary
value of help received.
Beginning with Panel A, about 44% of couples
transfer money to their noncoresident children and
55% of couples receive money from these chil-
dren. Some couples simultaneously make transfers
to and receive transfers from adult children. This
result is consistent with ethnographic work in Java
showing that parents subsidized their daughters
who left home to work in factories but the young
women in turn used their wages to buy clocks,
dishes, and radios for their parents (Wolf, 1991).
With respect to values, the average amount cou-
ples transfer to children (in the event of positive
transfers) is about equal to the average amount
couples receive from children. We also calculate
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monetary transfers as a share of household in-
come. The transfers couples receive from their
children account for only about 3% of their total
household income (this figure includes zero values
for couples receiving no transfers).
Transfers of time between parents and nonco-
resident children are much less frequent than are
transfers of money. Only 6.3% of parents mention
that noncoresident children spend time helping
them and only 5.3% of parents mention that they
spend time helping their noncoresident children.
From the perspective of couples as adult chil-
dren (Panel B), transfers of money to parents are
far more common than receipt of money from par-
ents. Over half of all couples transfer money to
the wife’s parents and a full 60% transfer money
to the husband’s parents, but only about one quar-
ter receive money from the wife’s parents, and
only one fifth receive money from the husband’s
parents.
The relative and absolute amounts of money
given and received differ depending on whether
the parents are those of the wife or the husband.
On average, the amounts that couples transfer to
the wife’s parents are about two times higher than
the amounts that couples receive from the wife’s
parents. In contrast, the amounts that couples
transfer to the husband’s parents are lower than
the amounts that couples receive from the hus-
band’s parents. It appears that couples are less
likely to transfer money to the wife’s parents than
to the husband’s parents but when they do transfer
money to the wife’s parents they transfer relative-
ly larger amounts. Also, although couples are less
likely to receive transfers from the husband’s par-
ents than from the wife’s parents, when they do
receive transfers they receive relatively larger
amounts. The money couples transfer to their par-
ents represents only 1%–3% of their total house-
hold income.
Transfers of time between couples and their
parents are infrequent. Only 3%–7% of couples
report transfers of time and they are more likely
to provide time than to receive it. Thus, whether
one considers a couple as the parents of nonco-
resident children, or as the adult children of non-
coresident parents, transfers of time are much less
frequent than transfers of money. The low fre-
quency of time transfers does not appear to be
driven by the lack of physical opportunity. Over
half of couples report seeing their parents at least
once a week, and almost 60% of couples see at
least one noncoresident child at least once a week.
About 70% of couples live within the same ad-
ministrative area (roughly equivalent to a county)
as their parents, and about 60% of couples live
within the same administrative area as one of their
noncoresident children. The infrequency of time
transfers suggests that the theory that the primary
motivation for transfers is a desire to exchange
money for time (or vice versa) does not hold for
more than a small fraction of the households in-
volved in transfers. We now turn to the multivar-
iate analyses. The results provide more insights
into motivations because they reveal how char-




We estimate five equations to characterize trans-
fers, from the parents’ perspective, with their non-
coresident children 15 and older. These equations
correspond to:
any transfer of money to children (MTC) and
log amount if greater than 0 (ln AMTC)
any transfer of money from children (MFC)
and log amount if greater than 0 (ln AMFC)
any transfer of time from children (TFC)
A probit function indicates whether transfers of
money (MTC, MFC) or time (TFC) occurred:
1 if a9X 1 n . 0
T 5 (1)50 otherwise
When monetary transfers (ln AMTC, ln AMFC), are
greater than 0, the amount transferred is given by:
ln A 5 b9X 1 m (2)
The probit and the log amount equations are
estimated separately. Estimating the equations si-
multaneously (joint pairwise) using functional
form for identification had no impact on the sub-
stantive results, nor were any of the estimated cor-
relations statistically significant.
The determinants of transfers from couples to
their adult children are presented in Table 2.
Clearly, parents with children in school are more
likely to transfer resources to their offspring. The
numbers of children in high school and in college
are strongly and positively correlated with both
the occurrence and the amount of transfers.
The labor market decisions and successes of
husbands and wives are also strongly associated
with transfers to children. As the husband’s earn-
ings rise, so too does the amount transferred. The
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TABLE 2. COUPLES AS PARENTS: MONEY TRANSFERS TO ALL ADULT NONCORESIDENT CHILDREN
Any Money Log Amount
Intercept
Number of children in high school
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Note: n 5 2,349. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
probability of a transfer is reduced when the wife
does not work. When she does work, the amount
transferred rises with her earnings. Thus mothers
as well as fathers are an important source of fi-
nancial support for the educational attainment of
their children.
Table 3 presents the models of money transfers
to couples from their adult children (Columns 1
and 2). As with monetary transfers in the reverse
direction, children’s enrollment status is strongly
correlated with the transfers parents receive. Spe-
cifically, the number of children currently in
school has a large and significant negative impact
on the likelihood that couples receive transfers
from children. When a transfer does take place,
however, the number of children in school has a
significant positive impact on the amount trans-
ferred. Some couples with children in school
probably receive relatively generous contributions
from other children who are helping to subsidize
their siblings’ education. Qualitative research doc-
uments this phenomenon on Java, where young
women who have left home to work send money
to help their younger siblings stay in school (Wolf,
1991).
The number of children who have completed
school is positively related both to the occurrence
of transfers to the couple and to the amount trans-
ferred. Educational attainment of children is not
related to whether couples receive a transfer but
it is a strong predictor of the amount transferred.
Controlling for the total number of children, as
the number of children who have attained rela-
tively high levels of schooling rises, the value of
transfers the couples receive rises as well. Con-
sistent with the repayment model of transfers, par-
ents whose adult children are well-educated re-
ceive more resources from their offspring than
parents whose children are less well-educated. Be-
cause we cannot control for children’s income lev-
els, however, the results for educational attainment
may partially reflect higher economic status of
better educated children (we address this concern
in the next section).
The labor force experiences of the couples
themselves are also significant predictors of
whether they receive transfers from their children.
As the earnings of either the wife or the husband
rise, the chance that the couple receives money
from their adult children declines. This result is
consistent with the prediction of the insurance the-
ory. When a couple’s economic situation makes
transfers less necessary, they are in fact less likely
to occur.
The correlations of the couples’ characteristics
with the amount of transfers received (for those
who receive anything) are somewhat different
from the correlations with whether a transfer oc-
curs. The level of the wife’s education and the
level of the husband’s earnings are positively cor-
related with the amount that parents receive from
their children. These results may arise because of
positive correlations between father’s and chil-
drens’ earnings and between mother’s human cap-
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TABLE 3. PERSPECTIVE OF COUPLES AS PARENTS: MONEY AND TIME TRANSFERS FROM
ALL ADULT NONCORESIDENT CHILDREN







































































































Note: n 5 2,349. Includes controls for the number of children living with the parents, whether a son is present, and
whether a daughter is present. Standard errors are in parentheses.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
ital and children’s earnings. Economically suc-
cessful parents may produce economically
successful children, who in turn can afford to
transfer relatively more generous amounts to their
parents.
The third column of Table 3 considers transfers
of time. Characteristics of couples affect the
chance that their children will provide services to
them more than do the characteristics of the chil-
dren themselves. Transfers of time from children
are less likely when the wife is not working or
when the husband’s earnings are high. None of
the indicators of children’s educational accom-
plishments are significantly related to whether
couples receive transfers of time. This result lends
support to the repayment hypothesis in that chil-
dren’s education is specifically related only to
monetary transfers.
Couples as Adult Children
We turn now to the perspective of couples as adult
children, for which a larger number of transfer
options exist. Couples can make transfers (of time
or money) to the wife’s parents or to the husband’s
parents, and couples can receive transfers (of time
or money) from the wife’s parents or from the
husband’s parents. We focus on the following (12)
types of transfers:
Any money to the wife’s parents and Log
amount if greater than zero
Any money to the husband’s parents and Log
amount if greater than zero
Any time from the wife’s parents and Any time
from the husband’s parents
Any money from the wife’s parents and Log
amount if greater than zero
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Note: n 5 1,688. All equations estimated jointly.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
Any money from the husband’s parents and
Log amount if greater than zero
Any time to the wife’s parents and Any time
to the husband’s parents
Data on transfers to two sets of parents allows
use of a parametric within couple estimator to ac-
count for heterogeneity across couples in propen-
sity to transfer. The occurrence of transfers of
money to the wife’s parents is modeled as a prob-
it:
MTPw
1 if a9 X 1 a TFP 1 j 1 n . 0w1 w w2 w w5 50 otherwise (3)
where TFP is an indicator of whether the wife’s
parents provided transfers of time and is included
to test the exchange (of money for time) hypoth-
esis.
When transfers of money are greater than 0,
the amount of money transferred is given by:
ln A 5 b9 X 1 b TFP 1 l 1 m (4)MTP w1 w w2 w ww
The occurrence of transfers of time from the
wife’s parents is also modeled with a probit func-
tion:
1 if a9 X 1 v . 0w1 w wTFP 5w 50 otherwise
A similar set of equations can be written for trans-
fers with the husband’s parents:
1 if a9 X 1 a TFP 1 jh1 h h2 h
1 n . 0MTP 5 hh 
0 otherwise
ln A 5 b9 X 1 b TFP 1 l 1 mMTP h1 h h2 h hh
1 if a9 X 1 v . 0h1 h hTFP 5h 50 otherwise
In these models, the heterogeneity terms j and
l, may be freely correlated but the remaining par-
ent specific residual components are all assumed
to be independent of one another and across par-
ents. Parallel sets of equations are estimated for
receipt and amount received from the wife’s and
the husband’s parents (MFP and ln AMFP) and for
time transferred to the wife’s and husband’s par-
ents (TTP).
The estimates of within couple (family) com-
ponents of transfer behavior allow us to assess the
degree of heterogeneity across couples in transfer
behavior (Table 4). The highly significant corre-
lations on the diagonal suggest that the extent of
heterogeneity is considerable. In some families,
transfers are more likely in all directions than in
other families.
Table 5 presents the coefficients for the equa-
tions predicting the occurrence and monetary val-
ue of transfers from a couple to the parents of the
wife and to the parents of the husband. The pro-
vision of transfers to the wife’s parents is strongly
associated with the characteristics of the husband
and the wife. Transfers to the wife’s parents are
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more likely when the wife is better educated,
working, earning a good income, and when she is
married to a man who is earning a good income.
These same characteristics increase the value of
the transfers that occur.
With respect to characteristics of the wife’s
parents, age does not affect whether the couple
transfers money to them (contrary to the impli-
cations of the old age security hypothesis). A fa-
ther in poor health increases the chance that a
transfer occurs but decreases the value of the
transfer. On the other hand, a mother in poor
health is unrelated to the chance of a transfer but
positively associated with the value of the transfer.
These results provide some support for the insur-
ance hypothesis. Consistent with the exchange hy-
pothesis, transfers are significantly more likely
when the wife’s parents have provided the couple
help in the form of time, although such help does
not increase the value of transfers.
With respect to the determinants of transfers to
the husband’s parents, the only characteristics of
the couple related to the occurrence of transfers
are the husband’s earnings (long term and cur-
rent), which are also positively related to the
amount transferred. The relative effects of the
husband’s long-term and current income vary
across the transfer equations. Long-term income
has a larger effect on whether a transfer is made
than does current income but current income has
a stronger effect on the amount transferred than
does long-term income. It seems that long-run
earnings determine the occurrence of transfers but,
given a decision to transfer, the amount responds
to the resources available at the time (as predicted
by the insurance model).
Several characteristics of the husband’s parents
positively influence the couple’s decision to trans-
fer money to them. As predicted by the insurance
hypothesis, transfers are more likely when the
husband’s mother is a widow and when the fa-
ther’s health status is poor. As predicted by the
exchange hypothesis, transfers are more likely
when parents have provided help to the couple in
the form of time. Only parental provision of time
affects the value of transfers the couple makes to
the husband’s parents.
Table 5 reveals that the provision of time to
couples from their parents is an important factor
in whether those couples provide money to their
parents. The determinants of whether couples re-
ceive time from their parents are presented in Ta-
ble 6. With respect to time from the wife’s parents,
the principle determinants relate to the couple’s
needs. For example, the likelihood of a transfer of
time is increased by the number of small children
in the couple’s household but decreased by num-
ber of adolescent children. Presumably a couple’s
needs for time from parents are higher when their
children are young and lower when children reach
adolescence. As the husband’s earnings rise, the
chance of time transfers goes down.
Our discussion of transfers from the perspec-
tive of couples as adult children has to this point
focused on the provision of money to parents and
receipt of time from parents. We now turn to the
models of whether couples receive money from
their parents and provide time transfers to them
(Table 7).
The couples’ characteristics play a greater role
than do the parents’ characteristics in predicting
both the occurrence and the value of monetary
transfers to couples from parents. Couples who
have provided time help to the parents are more
likely to receive transfers of money. Couples are
much more likely to receive money from the
wife’s parents when the wife has never worked or
is not currently working. Whether from the wife’s
or the husband’s parents, the chance of a transfer
declines as the earnings of the wife and of the
husband rise, suggesting that transfers at least
partly reflect needs. That a couple is less likely to
receive a transfer from the wife’s mother when she
is a widow is further evidence to this effect. On
the other hand, transfers from the wife’s parents
are more likely when the wife’s mother’s health is
poor.
Relatively few characteristics of either couples
or their parents are associated with the value of
transfers couples receive from parents. However,
the wife’s educational level is positively associ-
ated with the value of transfers from her parents.
The same relationship holds for the education of
the husband and the transfers from his parents.
The value of transfers from the wife’s parents rises
with her earnings and the value of transfers from
the husband’s parents rises with his current earn-
ings. The final set of results (Columns 5 and 6)
predict the occurrence of transfers of time from
adult couples to parents. Transfers of time to the
wife’s parents are less likely when the wife has
never worked and as the husband’s earnings rise.
Transfers of time to the husband’s parents are
more likely when the wife is educated and she
does not work and less likely when the earnings
of the wife and the husband are high. Generally,
parental characteristics are not related to the cou-
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TABLE 6. PERSPECTIVE OF COUPLES AS ADULT CHILDREN: TIME TRANSFERS FROM PARENTS
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Note: Standard errors in parentheses. All equations jointly estimated. Controls included for total household income,
whether parents live with sibling, and whether parents of spouse coreside. Characteristics of the parents are those for the
parents of the wife or the husband, as appropriate for the equation.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
ple’s decision to provide time help to either set of
parents.
DISCUSSION
Our results suggest that no single theory com-
pletely explains the complex interactions between
parents and adult children. Instead, the findings
from Indonesia support the hypotheses of several
models regarding motivations for transfers. Prior
to discussing our results in the context of these
models, however, it is important to recognize that
our ability to fully test the theories is limited in
two ways. First, testing for altruistically motivated
transfers requires data on net transfers received
over the entire life course rather than during a
limited period of time. Second, our data concern
only interhousehold transfers. Were we to apply
similar analytical methods to data on transfers
within households, different patterns might
emerge.
These caveats notwithstanding, the results from
Indonesia are particularly consistent with three of
the models: transfers as a source of insurance, the
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exchange of money for time, and repayments to
parents for educational loans. With respect to
transfers as a form of insurance, our results dem-
onstrate that transfers are systematically related to
the needs of the receiver and to the resources of
the giver in ways that suggest that families use
transfers to help one another out in times of need.
Couples are more likely to receive transfers from
their adult children when the wife is not working
and when she is older. As the husband’s or wife’s
earnings rise, reducing the need for money from
adult children, the likelihood of receiving a trans-
fer declines. Couples are less likely to make trans-
fers to their adult children when the wife is not
working, but they provide more generous transfers
as the husband’s earnings rise.
As adult children, couples are more likely to
transfer money to widowed mothers and to fa-
thers in poor health, and the amount transferred
rises when the mother’s health is poor. Couples
are more likely to receive transfers of money
from the husband’s parents when the husband’s
current income is low and less likely to receive
a transfer from the wife’s mother if she is a wid-
ow. Couples with small children are more likely
to receive time transfers from parents but couples
with adolescent children are less likely to receive
time transfers.
Two pieces of evidence are inconsistent with
the idea that families make transfers to one anoth-
er in response to times of need. Couples give less
money to the wife’s parents when the wife’s father
is in poor health, and couples are more likely to
receive money from the wife’s parents when the
wife’s mother is in poor health. The second result
may reflect the practice of transferring some assets
to children shortly before death, which is docu-
mented in the anthropological literature for Indo-
nesia (Geertz, 1961; White, 1977).
In some cases, the relationship between the
income levels of one generation and the amounts
transferred to or from the other generation ap-
pears inconsistent with the notion that transfers
are a response to need. For example, as the hus-
band’s earnings rise, so too do the amounts his
offspring transfer to him and his wife. This
anomaly likely reflects the fact that income levels
of parents and children are correlated but in our
models we can control for the income of only
one generation.
Our results are also broadly consistent with the
idea that money is exchanged for time. Transfers
of money from one generation to another are far
more likely when a transfer of time has occurred
in the opposite direction. Though the evidence
from the multivariate analysis supports the ex-
change hypothesis, the relatively low frequency of
transfers of time suggests that for most families
exchange of money for time does not explain
transfer patterns.
A number of our results support the theory that
parents finance their children’s education partly as
a loan repaid after the children complete school.
Couples are far more likely to transfer money to
their children when some of those children are en-
rolled in school. Additionally, the level at which
children are enrolled has a strong influence on the
value of the transfer that is made. In turn, couples
are more likely to receive transfers from noncores-
ident children when those children are not in
school, and the values of transfers couples receive
rise with the children’s levels of educational attain-
ment. From the perspective of couples as adult chil-
dren, the educational attainment of the husband and
the wife are also positively associated with the val-
ue of transfers to their parents.
One result, somewhat inconsistent with the
idea of parental repayment, is that couples’ in-
come levels and the wife’s work status affect the
occurrence and amount of transfers received from
children. In a formal borrower-lender relationship
the characteristics of the lender should not affect
repayment by the borrower, although arrange-
ments between parents and children may be more
flexible.
We end by remarking on the similarity of the
findings for Indonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia,
as in Indonesia, no one model clearly predomi-
nates. Families differ in their motivations for
transfers and in the extent to which transfers are
made. Notably, however, the models most consis-
tently supported by the findings from Malaysia are
the same three models that emerge most clearly
from our analysis of Indonesia: transfers as a
source of insurance, the exchange of money for
time, and repayments to parents for educational
loans.
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in Côte d’Ivoire: Empirical analysis of aggregate
flows. Population and Development Review, 23,
525–553.
White, B. (1977). Production and reproduction in a Ja-
vanese village. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.
Columbia University, New York.
Willis, R. (1980). The old age security hypothesis and
population growth. In T. Burch (Ed.), Demographic
behavior: Interdisciplinary perspectives on deci-
sion-making (pp. 43–69). Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Willis, R. (1982). The direction of intergenerational
transfers and demographic transition: The Caldwell
hypothesis reexamined. Population and Development
Review, 8, S207-S234.
Wirakartakusumah, D. (1998). Household structure and
the elderly in Indonesia. Unpublished manuscript, Ja-
karta: Demographic Institute, University of Indone-
sia.
Wirakartakusumah, D., Sirait, H., & Hidayat, Z. (1997).
Determinants of work and co-residence of the elderly
in Indonesia (Asian Population Studies Series No.
144). Bangkok: United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific.
Wolf, D. (1991). Female autonomy, the family, and in-
dustrialization in Java. In R. L. Blumberg (Ed), Gen-
der, family, and economy: The triple overlap (pp.
128–148). London: Sage.
World Bank. (1997). World Bank Development Report
1997: The State in a changing world. Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
